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Constitutional Law: Legislature May Require
Political Party Candidates to Be Listed First
on Ballot in Partisan Election
Charles Berg, a state senator, planned to run for reelection in
1976. Under the terms of a Minnesota statute,' the names of political
party nominees were listed on the ballot before those of independent
candidates.' Berg, an independent candidate, challenged the ballot
position statute3 on the ground that, by denying independent office
seekers benefits allegedly accruing to those listed at the top of the
ballot,' the statute violated the equal protection provision of the fourteenth amendment. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's determination that the statute was constitutional, holding
that the possibility of "positional bias" in a partisan election was not
an infringement of the right to vote sufficient to require strict scru1. MINN. STAT. § 203A.33(2) (1978).
2. Id.: "At the general election, and in the case of partisan offices only, the names
of candidates nominated by petition shall follow those of candidates nominated at
primaries in the order in which the petitions are filed."
3. Originally, the suit included several candidates of the Republican Party
(known in Minnesota as the Independent-Republican Party; see Shaw v. Johnson, 247
N.W.2d 921, 922 n.1 (Minn. 1976)) who objected to another statutory provision that
required a candidate of the party receiving the largest vote in the preceding general
election to be listed first on the ballot. At the time of suit this would have meant that
the candidates of the Democratic Party (known in Minnesota as the DemocraticFarmer-Labor Party; see Holmes v. Holm, 217 Minn. 264, 267, 14 N.W.2d 312, 314
(1944)) would be listed first. Before the lower court decision, however, the legislature
amended the law to provide that the candidates of the party with the lowest previous
vote be listed first. Act of April 9, 1976, ch. 224, § 3, 1976 Minn. Laws 828 (codified
at MINN. STAT. 203A.33(4) (1978)). As a result, the Independent-Republican Party as
plaintiff-intervenor, and the Independent-Republican candidates, were voluntarily
dismissed from the suit. Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 413 n.1, 413-14 (Minn.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
4. While the "top" of the ballot is reasonably clear for paper ballots, the meaning
of that term is less apparent as applied to voting machines. Minnesota Statutes section
203A.33(4) (1978) clarifies this by providing that "[for] voting machines, 'first name
printed for each office' means the position nearest the top or farthest left, whichever
applies."
Generally, the first ballot position is considered to be advantageous, whether
"first" means the ballot position at the top when the candidates' names are arranged
in vertical columns, the ballot position at the far left when the names are arranged in
a horizontal row, or the top left position when they are arranged in two or more rows
or columns. See Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (D. Mass. 1976); H. BAIN &
D. HECOCK, BALLOT PosITIoN AND VOTER'S CHOICE 16 (1957). But see Krasnoff v. Hardy,
436 F. Supp. 304, 309 (E.D. La. 1977) (horizontal position is not equivalent to vertical);
Board of Supervisors v. Murphy, 247 Md. 337, 341, 230 A.2d 648, 650 (1967) (horizontal
arrangement permits all candidates to share preferred top position).
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tiny of the legislative classification, and that the legislature's desire
to assist partisan voters in locating their party's candidates provided
a rational basis for the ballot position scheme. Ulland v. Growe, 262
N.W.2d 412 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).1
The United States Supreme Court has consistently granted
states wide latitude in regulating the mechanics of the electoral process.' The Court has also, however, acknowledged the fundamental
character of the right to vote and has required that actions regulating
this right be "necessary to promote a compelling state interest."7
Although the Court has not yet held that candidates' rights are
"fundamental," 8 it has recognized that the rights of candidates are
5. Following the trial court decision, but before the Minnesota Supreme Court's
decision, Berg ran as an independent candidate and was defeated. Ulland v. Growe,
262 N.W.2d at 414. Under accepted doctrines, the case was not mooted by the defeat,
however, since the controversy was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See,
e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974); Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057,
1060 n.3 (D. Mass. 1976); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 666 n.5, 536 P.2d 1337, 1340
n.5, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 n.5 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("Decision in this context
is very much a 'matter of degree' . . . .") (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 348 (1972)); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (state may reasonably
limit the total number of candidates on the ballot) (dictum).
7. Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969). In Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court said:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.
Id. at 561-62.
The Court usually analyzes voting cases through a standard equal protection
format, first determining whether a suspect class or fundamental right is affected by
the legislative scheme. If no such class or right is involved, the provision need only be
"rational."
The traditional "rational basis".test represents a judicial posture of extreme deference to the legislature, requiring that the challenged state action be upheld if any
justification could be imagined for it. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961). See generally L. TRmE, AmRIc CONsTrrUTONAL LAw §§ 16-2 to -5 (1978);
Tussman & tenBroek, The EqualProtection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. RzV. 341 (1949).
Legislation affecting a fundamental right or suspect class, on the other hand, must
undergo "strict scrutiny," generally defined as requiring the state to demonstrate that
the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest and that there is no less
burdensome method of accomplishing the state purpose. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972). Examination under the strict scrutiny standard is generally so rigorous, and under the rational basis standard so superficial, that the choice
of standard is largely determinative of the result. See note 48 infra and accompanying
text.
8. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972) ("[Ihe Court has not
heretofore attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous
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"intertwined with the rights of voters."' The Court has, therefore,
applied the equal protection clause to invalidate state laws regulating
the rights of candidates when such regulations infringed the voting
rights of candidates' supporters.10
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether discriminatory ballot position laws infringe the right to vote," but the question
has been faced by several other courts.' 2 Most courts have found,
standard of review.").
Although most courts have analyzed restrictions on candidates in terms of the
impact such restrictions have on the voting rights of the candidates' supporters, some
courts, apparently interpreting the Supreme Court's ambiguous language to mean that
the fundamental or nonfundamental nature of candidacy is still an open question,
have considered candidacy itself to be a fundamental right. See Mancuso v. Taft, 476
F.2d 187, 195 n.11, 196 (1st Cir. 1973)(rejecting a narrow reading of Supreme Court
cases that would restrict inquiry to situations in which voters were affected by candidate restrictions, and finding the right to run for office to be protected by the first
amendment); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 720-21, 484 P.2d 578, 581-82, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 602, 604-05 (1971)(compelling state interest must be shown to justify impinging
the fundamental right of candidacy); Johnson v. State Civil Serv. Dep't, 280 Minn.
61, 65, 157 N.W.2d 747, 750 (1968)(right of candidacy is protected by first amendment); Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wash. 2d 547, 552, 496 P.2d 512, 515 (1972)
(dictum). See also Gordon, The ConstitutionalRight to Candidacy, 25 U. KAN. L. Rv.
545, 562-65, 571 (1977) (arguing that the Supreme Court should consider candidacy to
be a fundamental right and that support for such a position can be found in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
9. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974); see Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
142-43 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974)(filing fee); Communist Party
v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 449 (1974)(loyalty oaths); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972)(filing fee); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)(ballot access). Some circuit
courts have also used this indirect approach. See, e.g., Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d
1119, 1126 (5th Cir. 1978) (Wisdom, J.) (chilling effect of requirement of financial
disclosure by elected officials); Manson v. Edwards, 482 F.2d 1076, 1077-78 (6th Cir.
1973)(age restrictions).
11. The Court has twice refused to consider claims of denial of equal protection
in ballot position cases, Voltaggio v. Caputo, 371 U.S. 232 (1963), dismissing appeal
as moot to 210 F. Supp. 337 (D.N.J. 1962); Ulland v. Growe, 436 U.S. 927, denying
cert. to 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978), although it did affirm an injunction concerning
ballot placement in Mann v. Powell, 314 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. ll. 1969), aff'd mem.
398 U.S. 955 (1970).
12. The diverse nature of the holdings of these other cases makes generalization
difficult. Some courts have concluded that the subject statute was unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977); Weisberg v. Powell,
417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969)(per curiam); Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D.
Ill. 1972); Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958); Gould v. Grubb,
14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975); Aryan v. Wayne County Clerk,
381 Mich. 761,160 N.W.2d 345 (1968) (summarized in Wells v. Kent Election Comm'rs,
382 Mich. 112, 122-23, 168 N.W.2d 222, 227 (1969))(rotation of names necessary under
constitutional amendment requiring nonpartisan alignment); Holtzman v. Power, 62
Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904, affl'd, 34 A.D.2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824, affl'd, 27
N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970); Walsh v. Boyle, 166 N.Y.S. 678,
rev'd, 179 A.D. 582, 166 N.Y.S. 681 (1917). Other courts have concluded that the
operative statute was constitutional. See, e.g., Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs,

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:517

either as a matter of judicial notice"3 or on the basis of expert testimony and statistical studies,'" that positional bias exists. The major447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971); Krasnoff v. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1977);
Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass. 1976); Voltaggio v. Caputo, 210 F. Supp.
337 (D.N.J. 1962), appeal dismissed as moot, 371 U.S. 232 (1963); Levy v. Power, 43
Misc. 2d 158, 250 N.Y.S.2d 511, affl'd, 21 A.D.2d 751, 252 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1964). In still
other cases, the courts' view respecting constitutionality is unclear. See, e.g., Mann v.
1969) (statute constitutional on face, but election
Powell, 333 F. Supp. 1261 (N.D. Ill.
officials must break ties in balloting positions by nondiscriminatory method like drawing lots); Diamond v. Allison, 8 Cal. 3d 736, 505 1.2d 205, 106 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1973);
Mexican-American Political Ass'n v. Brown, 8 Cal. 3d 733, 505 P.2d 204,106 Cal. Rptr.
12 (1973)(per curiam); Tsongas v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 708, 291
N.E.2d 149 (1972); Groesbeck v. Board of State Canvassers, 251 Mich. 286, 297, 232
N.W. 387, 391 (1930)(failure of election officials to alternate names of candidates in
one county as required by law held not to deceive voters on facts shown).
13. See, e.g., Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1977);
Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 1969)(per curiam); Kautenburger v.
Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, 130-31, 333 P.2d 293, 295 (1958); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d
661, 667-68, 536 P.2d 1337, 1340-41, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 380-81 (1975); Board of Supervisors v. Murphy, 247 Md. 337, 341, 230 A.2d 648, 650 (1967); Elliott v. Secretary of
State, 295 Mich. 245, 249, 294 N.W. 171, 173 (1940) (per curiam); Groesbeck v. Board
of State Canvassers, 251 Mich. 286, 297, 232 N.W. 387, 391 (1930); Holtzman v. Power,
62 Misc. 2d 1020, 1023, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907, affl'd, 34 A.D.2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824,
aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970); Note, Position of
Candidates' Names and Special Designationson Ballots: Equal Protection Problems
with the MassachusettsElection Law, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. Rav. 694, 706-08 (1975).
One authority avers that the Minnesota Supreme Court impliedly recognized the
effect of positional bias as long ago as 1913, by referring to the top position as the
"preferential" one in Heilman v. Olsen, 121 Minn. 463, 465, 141 N.W. 791, 791 (1913).
See Note, supra, at 710 n.101. See also Brief for Appellant at 8, Ulland v. Growe,
262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978). Justice Stevens made the
assumption that positional bias existed when, writing in his capacity as Circuit Justice
in Bradley v. Lunding, 424 U.S. 1309 (1976), he referred to a high ballot position as
"especially favorable." Id. at 1311.
14. See, e.g., Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460, 463 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977)
(listing authorities). See also H. BAIN & D. HECOCK, supra note 4; J. MUELLER,
RASON MD CAPRcE: BALLOT PATTRNS IN CALIFORrJIA (1965); Mackerass, The Donkey Vote, 40 AUsTL. Q. No. 4, at 89 (1968); Masterman, The Effect of the "Donkey
Vote" on the House of Representatives, 10 AuSTL. J. POL. & HiST. 221 (1964); Robson
& Walsh, The Importance of Positional Voting Bias in the Irish General Election of
1973, 22 POL. STUD. 191 (1974); Upton & Brook, The Importance of Positional Voting
Bias in British Elections, 22 POL. STUD. 178 (1974); White, Voters Plump for First on
List, 39 NAT'L MuNIciPAL REV. 110 (1950); Note, CaliforniaBallot Position Statutes:
An UnconstitutionalAdvantage to Incumbents, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 365 (1972) [hereinafter cited as CaliforniaBallot Position]. See generally MASS. LGISLATIV RESEARCH
COUNcIL, REPORT RELATIvE TO ORDER OF NAMES ON Tim BALLOT, MASS. H.R. Doc.
No. 5312 (Jan. 9, 1974); Note, supra note 13; Note, Equal Protectionin Ballot Positioning, 28 U. FLA. L. REv.816 (1976); see also Bagley, Does Candidates'Position on
the Ballot PaperInfluence Voters' Choice? A Study of the 1959 and 1964 British Gen-

eral Elections, 19 PARLIAMENTARY

AFFAIRS

162 (1966) (cited as erroneously concluding

there was no first position effect in Sandmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460, 466 n.12
(7th Cir. 1977)).
The most common method used to demonstrate the existence of positional bias is
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ity of these courts have held unconstitutional any scheme that determines ballot position in a discriminatory fashion.15 Commonly, the
courts have permitted the candidates' names to be rotated" or allowed ballot position to be determined by lot. 7
A minority of courts, on the other hand, have determined that
the existence of positional bias has not been proven," or that its
to study an election in which more than one format of the ballot has been prepared,
rotating the position of candidates' names. By comparing a candidate's percentage of
the vote when his name appeared in the top position on ballots with his percentage
when his name was in other positions, one may determine if ballot position influenced
the election results. See H. BAIN & D. HEcocK, supra note 4, at 47, 51-53.
15. See, e.g., Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977); Weisberg v.
Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp. 1280
(N.D. Ill. 1972); Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958); Gould v.
Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975); Holtzman v. Power,
62 Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904, affl'd, 34 A.D.2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824, affl'd, 27
N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970); cf. Mann v. Powell, 333 F. Supp.
1261 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (Secretary of State enjoined from discriminatorily exercising his
authority to determine ballot position); Aryan v. Wayne County Clerk, 381 Mich. 761,
160 N.W.2d 345 (1968) (summarized in Wells v. Kent Election Comm'rs, 382 Mich.
112, 122-23, 168 N.W.2d 222, 227 (1969)) (based on Michigan Constitution); Elliott v.
Secretary of State, 295 Mich. 245, 294 N.W. 171 (1940)(based on Michigan Constitu:
tion).
16. See, e.g., Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977)(permissible
methods of selection not limited to rotation); Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128,
333 P.2d 293 (1958) (rotation required rather than listing in alphabetical order); Gould
v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 676, 536 P.2d 1337, 1347, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 387 (1975)(permissible solutions include rotation, lottery, and possibly other nondiscriminatory
methods); Elliott v. Secretary of State, 295 Mich. 245, 294 N.W. 171 (1940) (mandated
rotation).
Ballot rotation involves the use of more than one ballot format to reduce or eliminate positional bias in an election. See generallyH. BAIN & D. HECOCK, supra note 4,
at 16-26. In the case of paper ballots, one common provision is to have the order of
names of the candidates for each office change with every ballot, so that each candidate's name will appear in every position a substantially equal number of times. This
can be done either by successively moving the top candidate from the head to the foot
of the list, or by varying the order of names so that each name is preceded at least
once and followed at least once by every other name. The latter approach, known as
"scrambling" the ballot, would also eliminate any effect due to relative positions of
the candidates' names. See id. at 103-04.
As with paper ballots, rotation on voting machines may be done by office group,
often with the requirement that all the machines in a precinct have the same format.
If, however, the legislature has provided that all the candidates of a political party be
listed in the same row or column (known as a "party block" ballot), normal officegroup rotation becomes impossible. Rotation may, however, still be done "in concert"
so that all candidates of a party are listed first on one ballot, second on the next, and
so forth; but unless all races involve an equal number of candidates, this results in
occasional blank spaces appearing in the list of candidates for a particular office. Id.
17. See Holtzman v. Power, 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904, 909, affl'd, 34
A.D.2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824, affl'd, 27 N.Y.S.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d
760 (1970)(determination by lot required).
18. Most courts have made such a determination on the basis of the lack of proof

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:517

impact on voting is insignificant, and have upheld state systems that
do not determine ballot position by a random method." A few courts
have also relied on evidence indicating that several factors influence
the magnitude of positional bias in an election-including the

"visibility" of the election" and whether it is partisan or nonpar-

tisan-in holding positional bias to be too insignificant to require
strict scrutiny of the legislature's purpose."'
In Uand, the trial court heard extensive expert testimony on the
existence of positional bias in legislative elections and concluded
at trial. See, e.g., Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971);
Krasnoff v. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1977); Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp.
1057 (D. Mass. 1976). See also Diamond v. Allison, 8 Cal. 3d 736, 505 P.2d 205, 106
Cal. Rptr. 13 (1973); Mexican-American Political Ass'n v. Brown, 8 Cal. 3d 733, 505
P.2d 204, 106 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1973); Tsongas v. Secretary of Commonwealth, 362 Mass.
708, 291 N.E.2d 149 (1972).
A few studies, in addition, have disputed the existence of positional bias. See, e.g.,
Byrne & Pueschel, But Who Should I Vote for for County Coroner?, 36 J. POL. 778
(1974)(criticized in Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460, 466 n.12 (7th Cir. 1977)).
19. See, e.g., Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971);
Krasnoff v. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1977); Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp.
1057 (D. Mass. 1976). See also Voltaggio v. Caputo, 210 F. Supp. 337 (D.N.J. 1962),
appeal dismissed as moot, 371 U.S. 232 (1963); Levy v. Power, 43 Misc. 2d 158, 250
N.Y.S.2d 511, affl'd, 21 A.D.2d 751, 252 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1964); Walsh v. Boyle, 179 A.D.
582, 166 N.Y.S. 681, rev'g 166 N.Y.S. 678 (1917).
20. Visibility refers to the level of public awareness of an electoral contest. It is
generally lower when the office sought is a comparatively insignificant one, or when
the candidates do not campaign vigorously. Record at 79-82, 90-96, Ulland v. Growe,
No. 406759 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, 1976) (testimony of Edward Brandt,
Assistant Professor of Political Science, College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, Minnesota).
It should be noted that the relevant consideration is not the visibility of an election
with respect to the population as a whole, but only among the people who go to the
polls. See note 22 infra.
Other possible factors include the size of the district, the number of candidates
to be elected, and the relative income and educational levels of voters within a district.
Brief for Respondent at 5 n.19, Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W. 2d 412 (Minn.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 927 (1978)(citing to expert testimony in the Record).
21. See, e.g., Krasnoff v. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304, 308 (E.D. La. 1977); Clough
v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1065-66 (D. Mass. 1976).
22. Three witnesses for the plaintiff testified to the existence of positional bias
in three Twin City municipal elections that, at the time of trial, were the only partisan
Minnesota elections for which the ballots had been rotated. See Record at 28-29,
Ulland v. Growe, No. 406759 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, 1976) (stipulation of
counsel); id. at 188 (testimony of Charles Backstrom, Professor of Political Science,
University of Minnesota). The plaintiff's position was also supported by William Morris, a University of Minnesota political science professor, who had examined a 1972
state senate race in Oregon. In that contest, which Morris compared favorably to a 1976
state senate race in Minnesota, id. at 130-31, 140, Morris found a positional bias effect
of 4.5%. Id. at 136. In the 1974 Minnesota House of Representatives elections, that level
of positional bias would have reversed the outcome of 22 elections. Id. at 154 (testimony
of William Morris).
A witness for the defendant claimed that his study of a Twin City municipal
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that positional bias exists in all elections, although to a lesser extent
in partisan or highly visible contests. 3 The Minnesota Supreme
Court gave weight to these findings,u but held that positional bias
presented less constitutional difficulty than infringements of other
kinds of voting rights previously found to be unconstitutional.n It
reasoned that the magnitude of positional bias present in partisan
elections was relatively small and could be reduced, at least in part,
by candidates' efforts to inform the public.26 The court concluded
that the alleged deprivation of voting rights was insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny and found the legislature's purpose of assisting
voters in locating partisan candidates to be a rational justification
for the statute."
In failing to apply a standard of strict scrutiny, the Ulland court
declined to analogize ballot position cases to those apportionment
cases in which strict scrutiny has been required by the United States
Supreme Court.2s Beginning with Gray v. Sanders" and Reynolds v.
Sims,3 the Court, in holding that all citizens have a right to equally
effective participation in the political process, 1 has insisted that congressional and legislative districts be equally apportioned on the basis
of population. The Court has reasoned that voters in disproportionately large legislative districts cast votes that are unfairly
election had produced no evidence of a positional bias effect. Id. at 220 (testimony of
Charles Backstrom). The plaintiff responded to this argument by noting that municipal elections, unlike state senate contests, were highly visible elections where the
amount of positional bias would probably be less than that in relatively less visible
state legislative races held concurrently with a presidential general election. See id. at
81-83, 91-92 (testimony of Edward Brandt); id. at 130-31 (testimony of William Mor-

ris).
23. Ulland v. Growe, No. 406759, at 1 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, July 1,
1976) (memorandum accompanying findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for
judgment), aff'd, 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
24. 262 N.W.2d at 414-15 (finding "expert testimony does indicate that an element of positional bias may be operating in some Minnesota elections").
25. Id. at 416-17 (quoting Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (D. Mass.
1976)).
26. Id. at 416 n.12 (quoting Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1066 (D. Mass.
1976)).
27. Id. at 417-18.
28. Id. at 416.
29. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
30. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
31. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures
are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired
fashion is a bedrock of our political system. ...
Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the
election of members of his state legislature. ...
Id. at 562, 565 (emphasis added).
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"diluted" by votes cast in relatively small districts." Thus, voters in
relatively large districts are unconstitutionally denied the right to
participate on an equal basis with other voters in the same democratic process. Similarly, one may argue, votes cast by supporters of
candidates victimized by discriminatory ballot placement statutes
are also diluted by the phenomenon of positional bias.
It is significant that the apportionment analogy was relied on in
a California case, Gould v. Grubb,3 in which a ballot position provision providing that incumbents be listed first was held unconstitutional. The California Supreme Court reasoned that placing the
names of incumbent candidates in the top ballot position diluted the
votes of the other candidates' supporters by allowing an incumbent
candidate the possible advantage of extra votes attributable to ballot
position. 4 The court concluded that the rationale of the apportionment cases required that ballot position classifications be subjected
to strict scrutiny."
The Minnesota Supreme Court, by contrast, reasoned that positional bias can be distinguished from malapportionment on two
grounds." First, since voters living in districts that benefited from
malapportionment cast a number of "phantom" votes, 3 malapportionment involves voting dilution of a genuinely mathematical nature. In contrast, those voters who choose a candidate on the basis of
ballot position are casting real votes that, although irrational, do not
cause arithmetical dilution.3 Second, the victims of malapportion32. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380-81 (1963) ("The concept of
political equality in the voting booth contained in the Fifteenth Amendment extends
to all phases of state election ....
[The District Court ... was right in enjoining
the use of [a system in which the effect of a vote decreased as the population of the
voter's county increased].").
33. 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
34. Id. at 672, 536 P.2d at 1344, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
35. Id.
36. The court relied on the additional ground of insufficient proof: "Unlike the
findings in Gould, the testimony below, while permitting a finding that positional bias
does exist, furnishes no adequate means for measuring its extent." 262 N.W.2d at 416.
The California Supreme Court, however, did not mention the exact magnitude of bias
present in Gould, electing to rely on the trial court finding that there was a "significant
advantage" accruing to the top ballot position. See Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661,
664, 667-68, 536 P.2d 1337, 1338, 1340-41, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 378, 380-81 (1975). The
findings in Gould do not appear to differ greatly from the findings in (Illand.
37. 262 N.W.2d at 416. When the vote totals of a small district are compared with
those of a large one, the total number of voters in each will differ by a mathematically
determinable amount. Hence, the residents of the small district effectively receive the
benefit of an equivalent number of "phantom" votes.
38. Id. A recent comment also criticized the California Supreme Court's use of
the concept of "diluted" votes from the apportionment cases. Comment, The Supreme
Court of California,1974-75: I1(A) Ballot PositionAdvantages, 64 CALW. L. Rv. 239,
338-39 (1976). The author of the comment observed that even after districts have been
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ment are completely precluded from remedying their underrepresentation, while candidates disadvantaged by their ballot position
can endeavor to increase the visibility of their candidacy and thus
reduce the impact of positional bias."
The court's emphasis on the mathematical nature of malapportionment can be faulted on two counts. First, by seizing on the measurability of the dilution of voting power as the relevant distinguishing factor,4" the court ignored the critical question of whether all
properly apportioned, voters in areas with high turnouts will have less voting power
than voters in low-turnout districts. Therefore, "it is apparent that both equality of
representation and nondiscrimination against identifiable groups are more important
than preserving the equality of the votes actually cast." Id. at 339.
The comment, however, erroneously applied the apportionment cases' votingpower rationale to the high- or low-turnout situation. Voters in high-turnout districts
have not been denied an "equally effective" vote. Since districts are apportioned on
the basis of population, not size of turnout, each person in high-turnout districts
receives the same amount of representation as each person in low-turnout districts.
Within the district, all voters have a fair and equal opportunity to influence the choice
of representative; voters in high-turnout districts thus have not suffered dilution of
their votes in terms that would affect the fairness of the political process.
That cannot be said of either malapportionment or discriminatory ballot position
cases. In the former, those in a district with a greater number of inhabitants suffer an
interdistrict disadvantage because they receive significantly less representation, per
capita, in the legislature. The danger is that a majority of the state's inhabitants will
not prevail on a political issue because they are offered the opportunity to select only
a minority of the state legislators. In the ballot position cases, voters supporting candidates harmed by positional bias suffer an intradistrict disadvantage in that they must
counteract the extra votes gained by the legislatively favored candidates. The danger
in these cases is that a plurality of the voters in a legislative district will not be able
to elect their choice of representative because the legislature has chosen to give certain
political groups an advantage. Multiplied across the state, this could lead to a legislative body just as unrepresentative as those found in the malapportionment cases.
39. 262 N.W.2d at 416 n.12 (quoting Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067
(D. Mass. 1976)). Given that the court perceived positional bias to be minimal, it
might well have attempted to buttress its arguments by analogy to those apportionment cases holding that de minimis malapportionment does not merit strict scrutiny.
See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 763-64 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735, 741-42 (1973). The analogy would be inapt. When drawing legislative boundaries, one must necessarily rely on census information that is already outdated. Some
malapportionment, therefore, is virtually inevitable. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court has required that the states create districts with as close to equal
populations as possible. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 22 (1975) (quoting
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964)); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526,
530-31 (1969). While perfect equality cannot be achieved in apportionment, ballot
position equality can be assured by rotating the names of the candidates on the ballot. See note 16 supra.
40. The court made reference to the difficulty of ascertaining just how much
positional bias could be expected in an election. See Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d at
416, 416-17 n.12. Given its admission that positional bias would exist in legislative
elections, id. at 414-15, the court's apparent concern with the level of bias present
implies that it thought that level to be possibly determinative of the statute's constitutionality. It seems clear, however, that any statistically significant level of bias could
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voters have a fair and equal opportunity to influence the outcome of
the election. Functionally, the rationale of the apportionment cases
demands that voting power not be distributed so as to favor voters
in certain areas of a state. 1 In a like manner, given the admitted
impact of positional bias on vote totals," courts should not allow
electoral procedures to systematically favor certain groups by allocating "donkey" votes43 to partisan candidates. Second, the court may
be criticized for relying on the notion that voting dilution caused by
positional bias is the result of voter irrationality, and since voters
have a right to vote irrationally," any dilution caused by discriminatory ballot placement statutes may not be impugned. The obvious
flaw in the court's analysis is its focus on the individual voter, rather
than on the action of the state. No one would doubt that an individual has a right to cast a vote on any basis that he wishes. One may,
however, question whether the state has the right to systematically
direct the irrational vote to partisan candidates. Those voters who
cast their vote on the basis of ballot position obviously are unconcerned with which candidate is chosen to represent them. The ultimate effective choice of a candidate is not that of the voters but of
the state, which chooses for them when it determines who will be
listed at the top of the ballot. The legislature's action, therefore, may
determine the representative of the voters.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's assertion that positional bias
may be remedied by more vigorous campaigns is also highly questionable. Voters cast "donkey" votes because they do not care enough
about an election to inform themselves. While most candidates will
presumably try to attract the attention of the public, it is unlikely
that they will succeed in communicating with uninterested voters.45
In addition, a legislative candidate's ability to communicate with
voters is limited by the relatively low level of funding generally preeffect the outcome of a close election. See note 14 supra.If effect on the election is not
the test, one can only speculate as to where the court would draw the line if the level
of bias could be determined to a certainty.
41. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, 562-63, 567-68 (1964); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963).
42. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
43. The term "donkey" vote refers to the ballots cast by those voters who select
a candidate on the basis of ballot position. See CaliforniaBallot Position, supra note
14, at 375 n.19.
44. 262 N.W.2d at 416. See Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D. Mass.
1976)("Voters have no constitutional right to a wholly rational election, based solely

on reasoned consideration of the issues and the candidate's positions, and free from
other 'irrational' considerations as a candidate's ethnic affiliation, sex, or home
town."). See also Krasnoff v. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304, 308 (E.D. La. 1977).
45. See W. FLANIGAN &N. ZINGALE, PouITcAL BEHAVIOR OF AMERIcA ELECTORATE
19-24 (3d ed. 1975).
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sent in such campaigns."
The court may also be faulted more generally for having failed
to explicate a standard for determining when a statute regulating
the electoral process constitutes a "sufficiently direct infringement
on fundamental franchise rights"4 to call for application of the strict
scrutiny test. Since here, as in many equal protection cases, the
choice of a standard of review was tantamount to a decision on the
merits,4" the court's failure to develop a principled test for distinguishing between cases involving important or insignificant rights of
candidates' supporters can only serve to obscure the "true basis of the
[c]ourt's decision . . .,.
It is clear that the traditional two-tiered test may not be appropriate for cases involving the rights of candidates. It is also obvious
that regulations affecting candidates cannot be easily divided into
those that directly infringe the right to vote, which must pass muster
under the strict scrutiny standard, and those that have a minor impact on voting rights, which must satisfy only the minimal scrutiny
test. A better approach would be to recognize explicitly that restrictions on the rights of candidates may have a greater or lesser impact
46. See H. ALEXANDER, MoNEYNPoLrics 117-21 (1972); G. THAYER, WHO SHAKES
THE MONEY TREE 9 (1973). The figures for state legislative campaign expenditures bear
out the low level of funds available. Furthermore, the amount available to candidates
varies depending on the office sought. In the 1976 Minnesota election for state legislative offices, for example, contributions from individuals, associations, funds, and political committees averaged $7,149 for each of the 168 senatorial candidates, while the
average was only $3,737 for each of the 333 state representative candidates. Compare
1976 CAMPAIGN FINANCE SUMMARY: II.
CANDIDATES FOR STATE SENATOR 1 (1977), with MINNESOTA STATE ETHIcAL PRAcncs
BOARD, 1976 CAMPAIGN FINANc E SUMMARY: I. CANDIDATES FOR STATE REPRESENTATIVE 1
MINNESOTA STATE ETHicAL PRACTIcES BOARD,

(1977).
47. Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d at 415.
48. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). Under the traditional formulation of the two-tiered test,
there are few cases in which a state classification has survived strict scrutiny. For some
of the rare examples see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 143 (1976) (upholding federal
ceiling on contributions to political campaigns); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681
(1973) (upholding fifty-day voter residence requirements); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216, 219 (1944)(upholding exclusion of Japanese-Americans from areas
of West Coast). Examples of a state law being held unconstitutional under the rational
basis standard of review are also rare. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 36364 (1970) (striking down requirement that members of school board be property owners); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 467-69 (1957)(irrational to exempt a particular
business entity from law), overruled, City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297

(1976). As Professor Gunther has noted, strict scrutiny has often been "strict" in theory
and fatal in fact, while other situations have received "minimal scrutiny in theory and
virtually none in fact." Gunther, supra, at 8.
49. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 110 (1973)(Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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on the rights of a candidate's supporters to participate on an equal
basis with other voters in elections." Similarly, regulations of the
electoral process may promote a variety of state interests, some of
which are certainly more important than others."1 The Minnesota
court should have considered the adoption of an approach that would
have permitted them to weigh explicitly "the interests which the
state claims to be protecting" against the "interests of those who are
disadvantaged" by the regulation."
The adoption of a more flexible decisional format, in addition,
would have been consistent with recent trends in equal protection
law. The United States Supreme Court appears to have used an
intermediate standard of review in cases involving sex discrimination." It has been urged, further, that the Court adopt a sliding scale
approach 5 that would resemble a balanced weighing of the relevant
factors." Some courts have explicitly formulated their own equal pro50. For instance, denial of access to the ballot box because of inability to pay
high filing fees, see, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972), is a much greater restriction on the ability of groups of voters to elect
a representative than refusing an independent candidate permission to place a statement of political philosophy or identification on the ballot. See, e.g., Krasnoff v.
Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1977); Ihlenfeldt v. State Election Bd., 425 F. Supp.
1361 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
51. For example, states appear to have a strong interest in placing some kind of
limit on the length of the ballot, see note 6 supra, but have less of an interest in
promoting the election of incumbents. See Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D.
Ill. 1972)(per curiam). See generally Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory
Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REv. 663, 668, 710 (1977).
52. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 353 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Several Justices have
criticized the two-tiered approach to equal protection cases. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd.
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 99 S. Ct. 983 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11, n. * (1976)(Powell, J., concurring); id. at 212
(Stevens, J., concurring); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59
(1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 62-63 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting,
joined by Douglas, J.).
54. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976)(Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973)(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Comment, A CaseStudy in EqualProtection:Voting Rights
and a Pleafor Consistency, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 934, 942-43, 945 (1976); cf. Simson, supra
note 51, at 678-81 (proposing multiparameter test).
55. At times, the Court has seemed to approximate a sliding scale or balancing
approach by emphasizing the various factors that must be considered in all equal
protection cases. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173
(1972).
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tection tests to supplant the two-tiered approach of the United States
Supreme Court."
The adoption of either an intermediate standard of review or a
sliding scale approach would have led to different results in the instant case. On one hand, the court accepted the existence of positional bias. 7 On the other hand, the justification for the ballot position statute under consideration in Ulland-that voters need assis-

tance in locating partisan candidates-is singularly unconvincing."
It is clear that the statute involved in Uland can escape invalidation
only under the most minimal level of scrutiny. 9
The court in Ulland misjudged the significance of the voting
56. See, e.g., Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir.
1973)("[The test for application of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute.")
(emphasis in original), rev'd on other grounds, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)(Supreme Court did
not apply Second Circuit formulation of test); Demiragh v. DeVos, 476 F.2d 403, 405
(2d Cir. 1973)(following Boraas); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 168-69 (D.
Colo. 1977)(adopting balancing test); Roe v. Ingraham, 357 F. Supp. 1217, 1219
(S.D.N.Y. 1973)(following Boraas); Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d
326, 334, 348 N.E.2d 537, 544, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82, 89 (1976) (dictum)("[W]e ... are
ready to adopt middle ground tests in situations where such review is warranted.").
The validity of these cases presumably depends on the view that it is the Supreme
Court's result and not its method of analysis that is binding on other courts in constitutional litigation.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has acknowledged the trend away from the twotiered test. See Davis v. Davis, 297 Minn. 187, 189 n.2, 210 N.W.2d 221, 223 n.2 (1973);
Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 364, 205 N.W.2d 318, 323, appeal dismissed, 414
U.S. 803 (1973). Justice MacLaughlin has been more explicit: "I . . .believe the
renewed vigor given by the United States Supreme Court to 'traditional' equalprotection review compels a stricter review of nonsuspect classifications and nonfundamental interests than has been granted in the past." Id. at 366, 205 N.W.2d at 324
(MacLaughlin, J., dissenting, joined by Rogosheske & Kelly, JJ.).
57. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
58. In the case of extraordinarily lengthy lists of candidates, further provision
arguably might be made for assisting partisan voters in locating their candidates. The
state has other, admittedly legitimate, methods of reducing voter confusion by limiting the number of candidates, see cases cited at note 6 supra,but there is no need to
extend such a concern to the much more common situation, such as that usually presented by legislative races, of contests involving only a few candidates. A recent case,
Board of Election Comm'rs v. Libertarian Party, 591 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1979) (strong
dissent by Swygert, J.), upheld the placement of major party candidates before minor
party candidates primarily on the basis that voter confusion would result from separation of slates of major parties on a party block ballot. The ballot under consideratidn
was quite complicated, containing nearly sixty elective contests, however, the court
could have obviated the difficulties involved in using on "in concert" rotation by
requiring the county election officials to determine the candidates' ballot position by
an office group basis. See note 16 supra.
59. Indeed, in Holtzman v. Power, 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 1024, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904,90809, affl'd, 34 A.D.2d 917, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824, aff'd, 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313
N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970), a provision that gave the first ballot position to the incumbent
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rights involved and chose the wrong standard of review under the
two-tiered test. The court should have utilized a mode of analysis
with which it could have better examined the conflicting interests
involved in positional bias cases. By neither developing an alternative
standard of review nor realistically confronting the "proper analytical
framework for dealing with the positional bias phenomenon,"6 the
Minnesota Supreme Court failed to provide guidance in the area of
voting rights and election procedures, and created uncertainty for the
Minnesota Legislature, practitioners, and lower state courts.

candidate was not even considered rational. On the other hand, however, the argument
that the voters were entitled to assistance in finding the incumbent was particularly
weak because the incumbent was not designated as such and a voter would have had
to know, independently of the information on the ballot, that the top name was that
of the incumbent.
60. 262 N.W.2d at 416.

